. The term is used here to describe a person who carries drugs across an international border for someone else. Drug mules play a minor, subordinate role in the supply chain, and so can be considered a distinct category of drug trafficker (EMCCDA 2012; Fleetwood 2011) . Whilst some legal scholars differentiate between willing 'couriers' motivated by profit, and 'mules' who are involved due to pressure (Smith and Gowlandt 2014, 396, FN 5) , profit and pressure are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Whilst some may become involved due to economic vulnerabilities, especially women due to the feminisation of poverty (Bailey 2013; Giacomello 2013; Dorado 2005; Sudbury 2005 ), coercion and violent intimidation are commonly used to control all mules (Caulkins et al. 2009; Fleetwood 2014) . Some consider the term, 'mule' derogatory i but it usefully distinguishes between categories of carriers: those working for others (mules), self-employed couriers (working independently) and organisers (who invest capital and employ others, including mules) (Matrix Knowledge Group 2009; Fleetwood 2014 ).
This array of roles in international drug trafficking is rarely reflected in drug laws, or in sentencing. For example, mandatory minimum sentences apply harsh penalties to all offenders regardless of their role, with considerable collateral damage (Oliss 1994; Chesney-Lind 2002; Youngers and Rosin 2005) . Huling reported that women mules served very long 'mandatory minimums' of fifteen years to life under the so-called Rockefeller drug laws (1996) . A similar approach can be found in South America where long sentences have been the norm (Metaal and Youngers 2011). 4 Sometimes no distinction is made between international drug trafficking, street level selling and use (Corva 2008; Giacomello 2013) . In England and Wales, mandatory minimums are not used, yet drug importers have been subject to very long sentences (more below). The negative consequences of the global war on drugs are well documented (Rolles, 2010; Collins, 2014) , and the harsh punishment of drug mules is part of this picture.
Since 1995, the focus in UK drug policy has been addressing demand for illicit drugs, in particular the link between offending and problem drug use through the expansion of treatment services for drug using offenders (Seddon, 2000 , Duke, 2006 Stevens, 2007) targeted via inter-agency and intelligence-led policing (Lee and South 2008; Dorn and Murji, 1992) which has continued in the establishment of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency in 2007 and subsequently the National Crime Agency in 2013. The powers of surveillance, intrusion and coercion bestowed on SOCA in order to pursue organised criminals are described by Lee and South (2008) as unprecedented -and in relation to drug mules, would seem to be the use of a hammer to crack a nut.
Seizure of drugs at the point of importation is therefore one element of supply reduction strategy in UK drugs policy and in terms of quantity, seizures by customs and excise from ports and airports account for most drugs seized (Reuter and Stevens, 2007) . Nonetheless, some have argued that the quantity of drugs transported by courier is a mere drop in the ocean, so apprehension is likely to have little effect on either 5 availability or price (Reuter and Stevens 2007) . The apprehension and harsh punishment of drug mules under the banner of deterrence, may serve a symbolic purpose, rather than an effective strategy. The NCA continues the approach followed by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which describes drug trafficking as 'the single greatest organised crime threat to the UK' (2007), linking it with arms trafficking, people trafficking and terrorism (2013). Drug mules, who are arguably the smallest cogs in the machine of organised crime, are therefore caught up in policies concerning the security and integrity of the British state.
Yet change is underway. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recently called for countries to 'ensure the adoption of proportionate penalties for drug offences'
and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and New Zealand are currently reviewing sentences for drug offences (Lai 2012: 2) . At the time of writing, Ecuador has just introduced a new penal code that retrospectively gives reduced penalties to 'micro-traffickers', including drug mules (Álvarez Velasco 2014). The distinct, subordinate role of mule is now recognised internationally (United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2009 Drugs , 2011 alongside popular and political consensus that punishment ought to be lowered to reflect this (Jacobson et al. 2011) . The sentencing guidelines examined here are the first to distinguish between roles in international trafficking and so represent a significant innovation in the realm of drug policy reform. importation involve a Class A drug, and so our analysis focuses on this group. We look specifically at the differences in sentence lengths according to the weight of drug carried and the person's role in trafficking, to explore whether the sentencing guidelines had the intended effect of improving proportionality, and reducing sentences for drug mules.
Overall, distinguishing between roles has resulted in shorter sentences for those in lesser roles. After the introduction of sentencing guidelines, 73% of those in lesser role were sentenced to four years or less. Nonetheless, a minority of those in lesser role received long sentences due to having large drug quantities. We start with a contextualised presentation of the new sentencing guidelines, before explaining our methods and findings. Although there is not scope for an in depth discussion here (see Harper et al. 2000: 102) , three key features characterise guideline judgments for Class A drugs during 1982-2012 (Harper et al. 2000) . Firstly, greater punishment was merited by greater quantities of illegal drugs (before 1994, this was estimated street value) (Harper et al. 2000; Fortson 1996) . Approximate tariffs were established in guideline judgements, for example the case of Aramah established that seven years was appropriate for a street value of £100,000 or more (ibid). The apparent rationale was that greater quantities of drug would have resulted in greater harm. Secondly, whilst attention was given to establishing and revising conventions around drug quantities, the offender's role was given little consideration although Fortson reported an 'expectation' that role is taken 7 into account (1996) . Lady Justice Hallett observed: 'there was a time when some judges divided offenders according to military ranks: generals, lieutenants and foot soldiers'. 1 Yet, little research documents how this was done in practice (Fortson 1996) , or what effect this approach had on proportionality. Thirdly, the Aramah guideline judgement established that sentencers ought to be led by the principle of deterrence, and so ought not take mitigation into account, especially in cases involving a Class A drug (Harper et al. 2000; Fortson 1996) . Personal mitigation typically includes good character, illness, and remorse (Cooper 2013) . The rationale was apparently to discourage traffickers from recruiting vulnerable individuals (Green 1998 ).
Analysis of sentencing data clearly shows the effect of these guideline judgements. In their analysis of sentences for drug importation in the 1990s, Harper et al. record that for Class A drugs the main determinants in sentencing were the estimated street value (pre 1994), drug weight (post 1994) and guilty pleas (2000) . Larger drug weights corresponded with longer sentences. During the 1990s, the average sentence for importing a Class A drug was 7 years 11 months for less than 5 kilos, and 11 years 6 months for larger quantities (Ibid: 110). Furthermore, personal mitigation had little detectable impact on sentencing: 'role, gender and children were not statistically significant predictors of sentence length' (Harper et al. 2000: 100) .
Whilst each nation has its own specificities, sentencing in England and Wales reflects some common themes in international approaches in sentencing drug traffickers, especially a logic of 'punitive deterrence' (Beckett 1997; Corva 2008 ) and rationalised punishment according to metrics of drug value/weight (Harris 2010; Fleetwood 2011) . Critics note that such rationalised models of sentencing assume individual choice and responsibility and minimise the significance of social inequality and vulnerability (Fleetwood 2011 ). In the case of drug mules in particular, these models of punishment often result in the harshest punishments for those in marginal In the consultation document, the Sentencing Council clearly states its intention to reduce sentences for drug mules due to their lower culpability for harm caused with the goal of remedying disproportionality:
There is one group of offenders, however, for whom in some cases the Council considers current sentencing to be disproportionate to the levels of culpability and harm caused. These are the so-called drug "mules". An increased focus on role in the development of the sentencing ranges for importation offences may result in a downward shift in sentences for these types of offenders, to bring them in line with the overall sentencing framework and ensure that these 9 offenders are sentenced fairly and consistently according to the severity of their offence. (Sentencing Council, 2011c: 4-5, our emphasis) . ii Drug mules are thus singled out in the guidelines as a group of offenders for whom sentencing has been disproportionate in relation to both 'level' of culpability and harm.
The guidelines suggest consideration of the differential role of the offender is likely to lead to more proportionate sentencing for drug mules in particular. This is both a matter of fairness and consistency and it is made clear that punishment ought to be proportionate to the culpability and harm caused, in keeping with the Sentencing Council's desire to achieve more proportional sentencing for drug mules in comparison to those offenders playing more leading roles in trafficking, it is also important to note that concerns about foreign national prisoners, especially women, many of whom are convicted of drug offences, is long standing (Prison Reform Trust et al. 2012) . Thus, although these changes are unlikely only to be a result of drug policy campaigns , such campaigns may have influenced the changes in sentencing policy.
There is only space here for a brief outline of the key aspects of the guidelines (Sentencing Council 2012b) for sentencing drug importers. Firstly, quantities of drugs feature as a proxy for harm. This is an important continuity with previous guideline judgements, however four categories of drug quantities are used. For cocaine and heroin importation these are: category 1 (5 kilos); category 2 (1 kilo); category 3 (150g) and category 4 (5g) (Sentencing Council 2012b). These are not 'threshold quantities' (Hughes et al. 2014 ), but are merely indicative. The assumption that greater drug quantities equal greater harm caused is a long-standing principle in sentencing, which has been subject to critique. Arguably, the 'harms' produced by the drug trade go well beyond simply bringing drugs into a country. Researchers document harms directly, and indirectly related to international drug trafficking, including interpersonal violence, political corruption, money laundering, urban degradation and lack of safety in public places (Zaitch 2009 (Green 1998: 9) compared with self-employed couriers who often carry smaller quantities than mules and so would receive shorter sentences (Green 1998 , Fleetwood 2011 ).
Secondly, , sentencers must make a decision as to whether the offender played one of three roles in importing the drug: 'leading' (someone in an organising capacity), 'significant' (someone in an operational or management role) and 'lesser'. The Council intends that the lowest category of culpability, 'lesser', apply to drug mules (2011c). It is described as someone who: 'Performs a limited function under direction; engaged by 11 pressure, coercion, intimidation; involvement through naivety/exploitation; no influence on those above in a chain; very little, if any, awareness or understanding of the scale of operation' (Sentencing Council 2012b: 4) . This list is non-exhaustive and is intended as a guide, given that defendants may fall into more than one category.
Together quantity (weight and purity) and role form the primary basis for determining a provisional sentence.
After considering drug weight and role, sentencers then consider mitigating and aggregating factors. This introduces consistency with other sentencing guidelines rather than undermining the concept of deterrence which remains a guiding principle of the sentencing guidelines (Smith and Gowlandt 2012) . Both standard mitigation factors are included (i.e. good character, remorse, ill health, caring responsibilities), and offence specific factors, crucially 'involvement due to pressure/coercion' and 'offender's vulnerability exploited' (Sentencing Council 2012b).
Thus, whilst the new guidelines may be motivated more by concerns with costcutting than, and are underpinned by a continuing concern with drug quantities as a proxy for harm, they nonetheless represent an internationally significant example of drug policy reform. This research seeks to understand if the sentencing guidelines have led to a reduction in sentences for drug mules (as intended), and if so how this has been achieved.
Methodology
To explore the impact of the guidelines on sentencing outcomes, sentencing data for cases involving importing/exporting a Class A drug was extracted from two sources. Secondly, data is drawn from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS).
Administered by the Sentencing Council, Judges are required to fill out a survey for each sentence given as part of on-going monitoring of sentencing. This survey 'constitutes a census of all sentences imposed by courts completing the forms, rather than a sample of cases' (Roberts 2013: 106) . In addition to recording the defendant's gender, age, and the length of the sentence (as the CPD does), it also records data specifically relating to the guidelines: the offender's role (leading, significant, lesser), drug weight (category of harm), previous relevant convictions, mitigating and aggravating factors and information about guilty pleas. This data enables analysis of how decisions about role, drug quantities, mitigation and guilty pleas affect sentencing.
Since the CCSS records factors that were only taken into account after the introduction of the guidelines, meaningful data can only be draw from the CCSS after the guidelines were introduced (for the last three quarters of 2012 and 2013). Although Roberts describes it as a 'census', in fact the non-response rate for the CCSS is approximately 39% (Pina-Sanchez and Linacre 2013: 1131; Roberts 2013a), and rate of survey completion varies by court, from 18% to 90% (Sentencing Council 2012c: 11).
Comparing the number of cases listed in the CPD and the CCSS reveals the response rate for cases involving drug importation/exportation is 55% for 2012, and 56% for 2013.
Since the CCSS is incomplete, analysis explores tendencies rather than correlations.
Analysis focused on changes in sentencing for importing a Class A drug only.
Relatively few people are convicted of importing Class B and C drugs each year and the situation is distinct. iv Particular attention was given to the impact of the guidelines on sentences for those in 'lesser' roles. Whilst it is not known how sentencers categorise 13 defendants' roles, it is reasonable to assume that most of those in a 'lesser' role will be mules, even if the converse is not necessarily true. Firstly, the number and proportion of sentences in the range of 5-10 years decreased (see table 1 ). This category has, historically, comprised the majority of sentences (average sentences fall into this group). In 2012, sentences in this range represented 32% of sentences and in 2013, just 24%. Secondly, an increase in the number of sentences of less than 4 years is observable. In 2012, 42% of Class A importers were sentenced to less than 4 years, but in 2013, this dropped to 25%.. In summary, sentences continue to be spread across a wide range; however there has been a general downward shift in sentences.
Sentencing trends for importing a Class
[ Table 1 (Coleman 2013 , Home Office 2013a , 2013b . Reflecting this, most sentences recorded in the CCSS concerned quantities of around 1kg (category 2).
Around a quarter were for large quantities of around 5 kilos, and around 15% involved quantities of 150g (category 3). There was only one instance involving a category 4 quantity (around 5g) in 2012, and 6 in 2013. Sentences for importing a category 4 quantity (around 5g) are the same as for supply.
There is a clear relationship between sentence length and drug weight after the introduction of the guidelines (see Figure 2) . Offences involving importation of drugs in the region of 5 kilos comprise almost all sentences longer than 10 years, and represent about half of sentences over 5 years and up to 10 years. At the lower end of quantities imported, most sentences for drug quantities in the region of 150g (category 3) were less than four years. Interestingly, sentences for cases involving approximately a kilo (category 2) varied from 12 months to over 10 years.
[ Figure 2 here]
Offender's role and sentence length
The offender's role has a clear impact on sentence length (figure 3). Sentencers recorded very few defendants as being in a 'leading' role (only 25, or 9%), 40% (106) were in a significant role, but the majority (144, or 52%) were in a 'lesser' role category.
Most (73%) of those in a 'lesser' role received a sentence of 4 years or less. In comparison, 80% those in leading roles received sentences of 5-10 years, or more.
Despite this overall trend, a small number (12 out of 144) of those in a lesser role received sentences over 5 years. Conversely 3 of those in a leading role received a sentence of less than 3 years.
[ Figure 3 here] Thus, the intended effect of maintaining long sentences for those in leading roles, and shorter sentences for lesser roles seems to have been at least partly achieved.
Interestingly, sentences for those in significant roles vary enormously in length, ranging from non-custodial to over ten years. This middle role includes those in management roles as well as couriers motivated by profit, or with some awareness of the scale of the operation (also Loveless 2012). The application of these categories in sentencing will inevitably involve a degree of interpretation by judges.
Sentences for drug mules
Two intended effects of the sentencing guidelines are evident so far: shorter sentences for offenders in a lesser role, and for those caught with smaller weights of drugs. We now consider what implications these trends may have for sentences for drug mules, and what effect taking mitigating factors into account may have on sentence length. The factors influencing long and short sentences are examined in turn.
Long sentences
In 2012 and 2013, twelve (8%) of those in a lesser role received sentences of 5 years or more. Since most of those in a lesser role receive shorter sentences, these exceptional cases were analysed for explanatory factors. The influence of mitigating and aggravating factors on sentencing is difficult to judge from available data. Aggravating factors were not noted in the majority of cases, and typically only one (high purity) was recorded. In contrast, several mitigating factors were noted in most cases (an average of three), usually: no 'previous relevant convictions', 'isolated incident', and 'good character'. Only one defendant had a previous, relevant conviction. In fact, the only commonality is large drug quantities: in most cases, the defendant was arrested with around 5 kilos (category 1, the most serious). Thus, even when mitigating factors are noted, those in a 'lesser' role may still receive a long sentence in the range of 5-10 years when importing larger quantities of drugs. Arguably, the reintroduction of mitigation for drug mules carrying larger quantities has had a rather limited effect.
Short sentences
As mentioned above, most of those in a lesser role received sentences of four years or less after guidelines were introduced (73%, or 102). Most had small drug quantities (36 had a category 3 quantity (around 150g); 43 were arrested with quantities in the range of category 2 (1kg), and just 5 were arrested with a category 1 quantity). v As occurred with long sentences, mitigating factors were noted in most cases (75%), most commonly 'good character' or 'remorse'. The two most commonly mentioned were: involvement due to pressure/coercion (in 28% of records) and offender's vulnerability exploited (in 25% of records). These were newly allowable when the guidelines were introduced so it is not known how they are established in court, given that most defendants pleaded guilty. Furthermore, the impact of mitigating factors remains at the judge's discretion and so while they may be noted, it is difficult to assess what influence they may have had on sentence length (Cooper 2013 ).
Interestingly, there was one instance of someone in a lesser role carrying a large quantity but receiving a short sentence (between 18 months and 3 years). The judge noted mitigating factors including that the offender's vulnerability was exploited, and they had a serious medical condition. The maximum reduction was given for guilty plea (33%), yet the sentence lies much below the range described in the guideline (6-9 years' custody) (Sentencing Council 2012b) . Thus, mitigating factors may sometimes reduce 18 the sentence quite significantly below that described in the guidelines. It is also important to note that there may be other factors taken into account that influence sentence length that are not recorded in either data set e.g. a defendant assisting the police in their investigations. As noted above, very short sentences like this did occur before the 2012 guidelines were introduced (see Table 1 ).
Finally, it seems that those in lesser roles are much more likely to plead guilty at the first available opportunity, and were also more likely to receive the maximum discount possible for guilty pleas, even when they did not plead guilty at the first available opportunity [ Table 2 here]
Discussion
The sentencing guidelines appear to have immediately resulted in shorter sentences for those in lesser roles. This group comprise approximately half of those sentenced for importing a Class A drug, much above the Sentencing Council estimates of 10-30% (2012d: 5). Differentiating sentences according to their role appears to play a major role in accomplishing proportionality. Nonetheless, some caveats must be made.
Firstly, as commentators predicted (Harris 2011; Fleetwood 2011) , the continued use of drug weights appears to produce arbitrarily harsh sentences for some of those in a lesser role. Although this occurs in a relatively small proportion of cases (8%), it is troublesome that it occurs at all. The fact that some in a 'lesser' role receive sentences commonly given to those in significant or leading roles (between 5-10 years), undermines the intended principle of proportionality if it is accepted that those in lesser roles have little control over quantity of drugs carried (Fleetwood 2011) . Indeed, rarely, those in leading roles could receive shorter sentences than mules due to the use of drug weights as a proxy for harm (see Figure 3) . We therefore argue that role ought to take 19 primacy over drug weight at sentencing. Doing so would support the stated aim of proportionality in sentencing of drug mules in comparison to those in leading roles. It would also reflect the fact that those in leading roles may be responsible for wider harms than simply transporting illegal drugs.
Secondly, the use of drug quantity may have the unintended effect of reducing punishment for those with greater culpability than mules. In 2012 and 2013, around a quarter of defendants were sentenced for offences involving small quantities of around 150g of less (category 3 and 4). Such quantities are probably not indicative of a commercial trafficking operation employing mules since the potential profit would barely meet the costs of paying a mule including international flights, purchasing and packaging the drugs and so on (Fleetwood 2011) . So members of this group are likely to be 'self-employed couriers' carrying drugs for themselves (Caulkins 2009 ). It may also be the case that,, as the guidelines become better known, these self-employed traffickers adapt the quantities they carry in response to guideline thresholds (Matrix Knowledge
Group 2009).
Thirdly, the CCSS reveals that 38% of those sentenced for importing a Class A drug are placed in the rather ambiguous 'significant' (operational or management) role.
Legal commentators have noted confusion about what exactly constitutes a mule and whether it is different to a courier (Loveless 2012) . It may thus be that mules are being sentenced in a 'significant role', especially where it is thought that they had a level of knowledge about what they are doing, or were motivated by profit despite their minor role (ibid). Qualitative analysis is needed to help unpick this question.
There are a number of puzzles that could be more clearly answered drawing on qualitative data. In the analysis here, 'lesser role' is assumed to be more or less contiguous with drug mules (indeed this was the intention of the Sentencing Council).
Nonetheless, the category of mule is contested (Loveless 2012) . Sentencers must determine whether a person was involved due to coercion, or financial gain, yet the two 20 are not mutually exclusive (Fleetwood 2014 ). Whilst CCSS data shows that involvement due to coercion is sometimes noted, questions about when such accounts are deployed, and how their credibility is assessed by sentencers are yet to be explored. This is an especially important question since claims of coercion or pressure will most often rely on the offender's testimony alone. Furthermore, a large proportion of defendants are likely to be foreign nationals, for whom sentencers will not have access to pre-sentence reports. Whilst sentencers are obliged to take into account mitigating and aggravating factors, their relative impact on sentencing can only be understood by analysing court observation and sentence transcripts (Padfield 2013 ).
Finally, research (pre 2012 guidelines) found that mules sometimes pled 'not guilty' on the basis that they were coerced and sometimes received longer sentences of up to 14 years as a result (Fortson 1996; Green 1998; Marshall and Moreton 2011) . Our research points to a relatively high incidence of guilty pleas (and discounts) for those in lesser roles. Qualitative research is needed to explore advice given to defendants regarding plea as well as the role of legal defence in establishing mitigation.
Caveats must also be made with regard to the data available and methodology.
This analysis represents one of a handful of investigations drawing on Crown Court Sentencing Survey data. Whilst some authors are optimistic about its usefulness (PinaSanchez and Linacre; Roberts 2013b), low response rates and incomplete forms limit indepth analysis of sentencing decision-making. Whilst the availability of case level data is creditable, the categories used to record sentences are too broad to allow more finegrained analysis, in particular for sentences described as 'over ten years but less than life'. Furthermore, potentially significant variables are omitted, in particular the defendant's ethnicity and nationality. Part-time judge, Nicola Padfield comments: 'This is not to say that that the survey is of no use, but its overall utility has to be questioned compared to more detailed qualitative data ' (2013: 45) . Given these limitations, our analysis also draws on the court proceedings data, which is a comprehensive record of 21 all sentences. Although it is less nuanced, it enables a clear understanding of historic fluctuations in sentencing patterns contextualising recent developments.
Conclusion
Overall, the sentencing guideline appears to have achieved greater proportionality: those in lesser roles generally received shorter sentences than more serious offenders, however the use of drug weights has the potential to produce aberrant outcomes, especially for drug mules carrying large quantities Thus, whilst the sentencing guidelines seem to represent a turn away from 'punitive deterrence' (Beckett 1997 ) towards greater proportionality, the continued use of drug weights represents a rationalised form of punishment which undermines this aim.
Establishing causality is notoriously difficult. Contextualising 2012 and 2013 changes against the previous decade reveals considerable fluctuations in long-term trends. Some changes (for example a long slow reduction of sentences in the range of 5-10 years) precede the guidelines. Commentators have argued that, rather than guidelines influencing practice, the reverse may be true (Roberts 2013b ). In the case of drug importation, the guidelines introduce new factors into sentencing: specifically codifying role and admitting mitigating factors. We tentatively suggest that these factors may have driven an unprecedented increase in short to medium term sentences in the range of 3-4 years'.
The sentencing guidelines do not represent a dramatic change in drug policy in the UK. Deterrence remains, as does a commitment to reducing availability of drugs. The future impact of these guidelines, both in England and Wales and further afield, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, this change is internationally significant for drug policy reform.
Taking into account defendant's role is a novel innovation, with strong potential to promote proportionality. Disproportionate sentences for drug mules are not only
